New report on19 Cites and 16 Industries in China

• Published on December 1, 2016

“2017 China City and Industry Report: A Guide for U.S. Exporters”

摩根士丹利报告指出，当下的中国，大批债务即将到期，借款人资金吃紧，经济增长放缓，货币政策收紧，市场利率攀升，投机信贷和旁氏信贷当道。所有这些都预示着，信贷正在枯竭，中国的“明斯基时刻”已经越来越近，GDP增长或将降至5%。

大摩在过去两年中曾详细介绍，中国的“两个过度”(过度负债和过度投资)必然不可持续，一旦停止将造成中国经济大规模放缓。近几周，在考察了一些地区，并对中国的影子银行(行情专区)进行深入研究之后，大摩相信中国正在接近“明斯基时刻”，“两个过度”无序崩溃的可能性进一步增加。随着越来越多的贷款被用作非生产性投资和用来偿还旧债，中国经济的信贷生产效率已经恶化。

大摩的基本判断是，在未来两年内，中国的GDP增长可能会从7.7%下降至5%。大多数人分析师认为，中国经济将会成功实现软着陆，2014年和2015年的增长分别为7.4%和7.2%，对全球经济也不会有太大冲击。但大摩认为，中国增速放缓严重冲击到全球经济，全球企业的盈利能力将随之大幅下降。

“明斯基时刻”是以新凯恩斯主义经济学家海曼·明斯基的名字命名。明斯基认为，随着市场上投机性信贷和旁氏信贷的增加，信贷环境恶化，金融系统出于避险考虑收紧信贷，当经济体系提供的贷款已经不足以支撑流动性需求时，就会出现“明斯基时刻”。“明斯基时刻”是市场繁荣与衰退之间的转折点。

明斯基在其“金融不安定假说”中描述了信贷周期对经济的影响，该假说将信贷周期分为三个阶段。第一，避险信贷阶段，投资者们负担少量负债，偿还其资本与利息支出均无问题。第二，投机信贷阶段，投资者扩大融资规模，以致只能负担利息支出。第三阶段，即旁氏骗局阶段，投资者手头的现金已经不足以支付利息和本金，必须不断借新债或出售资产才能维系流动性。明斯基时刻表示的是市场繁荣与衰退之间的转折点(下图Display 1).

明斯基指出，“在避险信贷主导的市场，经济系统会寻求内部均衡。而在投机和旁氏信贷主导的市场中，经济偏差被放大的风险就会增加。”好日子的时候，投资者敢于冒险；好日子的时间越长，投资者冒险越多，投资信贷和旁氏信贷的成分就越大，经济就越不稳定。

摩根士丹利认为，中国经济已经进入了由投资信贷和旁氏信贷主宰的阶段。当下的中国，大批债务即将到期，借款人资金吃紧，经济增长放缓，货币政策收紧，市场利率开始攀升，借贷成本升高，信贷日趋枯竭。所有这些都暗示我们，中国的“明斯基时刻”已经越来越近。

宏观来看，很少有经济体的债务向中国过去五年那样疯狂增长。中国私人部门贷款占GDP的比例从2007年的115%暴增至193%(下图Display 2)。五年内增长了80%，而美国从2000至2005年期间仅增长了26%。近年来，只有西班牙和爱尔兰的增速超过了中国。

而且，有证据表明，债务增长是过度的且并没有进入生产部门。2005年左右，每增加1元债务能带动1元的GDP，而如今，每增加4元债务才能带动1元的GDP.2009年，在政府大规模的经济刺激下，银行新增贷款暴增到两倍以上。虽然政府此后开始有意控制信贷增长，但影子银行开始飞速膨胀。5年前，影子银行的信贷规模仅占GDP的12%，但如今已经飙升至40%，并占到信贷总规模的五分之一。

我们认为，中国经济如今正处于投机信贷和旁氏信贷阶段。当从事投机信贷和旁氏信贷的投资者无法再从市场上融到足够钱的时候，明斯基时刻就到了。明斯基认为，该时刻通常会在央行收紧货币政策时引发。在我们看来，中国眼下正处在这一关口。

中国央行已经连续九个月收紧信贷。银行间市场融资成本正在升高，自去年五月以来，1月期上海银行间贷款利率上升了220个基点。央行四季度的货币政策报告指出，为了控制影子银行的过度增长，今年的流动性依然会趋紧。

影子银行发放的1.8万亿美元信托贷款，有6000亿将于2014年到期.

当下的中国，大批债务即将到期，借款人资金吃紧，经济增长放缓，货币政策收紧，市场利率开始攀升，借贷成本升高。所有这些都暗示我们，中国的明斯基时刻已经越来越近。

固定资产投资将成为受到冲击最明显的部门。尤其是基础设施建设、房地产(行情 专区)及相关产业(水泥、钢材、机械(行情 专区)制造等).

随着时间的推移，经济增长放缓和违约的增加将引发政府干预。央行宽松的货币政策和政府的财政刺激或将并行。但到那时，那些高度依赖债务的行业状况及其对固定资产造成的冲击可能已经非常严重了。

最后大摩认为，明斯基时刻之后，中国经济将严重放缓至5%，并导致全球性的企业盈利衰退。

我们看到，许多分析师认为中国经济增长将比目前预期的还要慢，但全球经济已经为此做好了准备。但我们的结论更加悲观：我们认为，中国GDP增长每减慢1%，全球经济增长就会随之放缓0.6%。在中国经济增长7.4%的基础上，2014至2015年，全球经济增速约为3%左右(下图Display 6).

冉学东：人民币汇率加速下跌 房地产企业首当其冲

Turbulent Past, Uncertain Future

(Beijing) –British-born public intellectual, Jonathan Spence, has just released the 3rd edition of his most acclaimed work, “The Search for Modern China,” in the United States. This book, a survey of Chinese history spanning from the dawn of the Qing dynasty to the present day, emerged from his introductory courses given at Yale University, where Spence served as Sterling Professor of History for 15 years.

Taking aim at the prevalent idea of Chinese history which begins with the collapse of the dynastic political structure, Spence provides a view in which the country’s periods of weakness can be understood as part of a larger process in its development. China has absorbed many ideas from abroad and in some instances this emerged from both imperial weakness and imperial pressure, said Spence.

In a recent interview with Caixin, Spence talked about his understanding of Chinese history and the modern China. Excerpts of the interview follow.

Caixin: Let me start with your classic book “The Search for Modern China,” published 24 years ago. In this book you mention that by looking back at the histories of the late Ming and Qing dynasties, we can gain a sharp understanding of the forces now confronting China and the chances for and against the troubled nation now claiming its place in the world. So 24 years after the publication of this book, what’s your take on today’s China?

Jonathan Spence: The thing that most interested me, was that perhaps in more conventional histories of China, as we entered the 1990s, there was a sense that Chinese history began with failure, collapse either of the Ming or Qing era political structure. And we lived through that. That was the way “China” tended to be taught – collapse, followed by deeper collapse and then some kind of dramatic change and revolutionary redeployment of national resources. And so I felt that in my teaching a general introductory class at university, I thought what would happen if we start with a much more powerful China, integrated despite huge tensions and some warfare.

But if we started with a strong China, then with students and the public alike, you have a different kind of view of the period of weakness. The period of weakness is not therefore an ongoing process, it’s really a shorter process in a pattern of change and real development.

I tried to be careful not to over-generalise totally beyond my knowledge—China is so huge. The evidence from different points of view is so great that one has to be careful and think through what the main issues are.

Your books trace the influence of Western cultures and technologies on China. So do you think this influence still carries weight today? How does this inform the relationship between China today and the rest of the world?

It’s a huge question. I think China came into the People’s Republic period with a very large legacy of troubles in the past and a very mixed series of relationships with foreign powers. And sometimes those relationships had been very encouraging – my first book, just after I was a student, was called “To Change China.” That was looking at a stream of influence coming from the West that was being used to analyse China right from the Ming dynasty onwards.

It usually starts in our analysis with church missionaries. Matteo Ricci is an example of someone who is able to have several agendas at once – he is a Christian missionary, he is a Catholic thinker, and he is the first Westerner probably to have learned really good Chinese, which he could use in conversation. He is certainly the first Westerner who could write books in Chinese and I was very intrigued by that. That seemed to be a high achievement, to be able to use your time in China to strengthen that kind of ideological climate of opinion in which a foreigner could meet with quite senior officials, or official people with official rank from the late Ming and Qing period.

So I was ready to accept that, I mean it seemed to me that was the way history had unfolded itself, and then the question is why did things go so sour? Why did it get so bad? And it was partly, I think, because of imperial weakness in China, but it was also because of imperial pressure, and a very demanding series of kickbacks to be made by the Chinese. We call that the “treaty port system.” The treaty port was a way of limiting China’s development of its own resources and leaving the management of those resources to foreigners. That eventually became unacceptable.

There was a study recently by an Italian sinologist, which looked at the Italian relationship with China, which is not well known at all. But the particular thing that struck this scholar, was that if one took a look at China’s situation, in the late 19th century, Italy was the last of the foreign powers that had imperial ambitions – or we might say imperialist ambition – and so they went to the Qing court, just like so many Chinese had done before them, so many of the Manchu had done before them. And the Italians put in a demand to the imperial system, and the imperial spokesperson said, “No, no, you’ve done enough of this, and we will not give you the concessions you wish.” And the Italians took this quite seriously, but they couldn’t get the Qing to change their minds.

The scholar who wrote the book thought that that was a big breakthrough. It seems a small solution to the problem, but actually it marked a moment right about 1898, where you had the Guangxi reforms, and that showed you the possibility of moving in on the system and perhaps changing the system, and so there’s a sort of connection perhaps from that refusal to grant any more concessions that was linked, if we jump forward in time, with some similarities with the Chiang Kai-shek regime, which did put a lot of energy into tariff reform and legal reform and educational reform and that I think can be counted positively for the Kuomindang, who faced themselves a very, very difficult situation. As you can probably tell, I’m the sort of historian who sees everything as leading to something else, and that is part of the difficulty of writing a serious study of modern China, however you define it.

I think you specialise in China by telling individual stories. So if today, you were to write a book about China, who would be your main characters?

Well that’s always difficult, because different ideas overlap. But in the first talk I gave at Peking University, I was thinking mainly of the first Chinese who came to Europe – of which we have careful information – and that is Shen Fuzong, who was from Nanjing territory, but who also was Catholic. His father had been converted to the Catholic religion and Shen Fuzong was willing to travel into Western countries in contact with the church at the time. It’s well recorded that in 1687, Shen reached Europe and actually went to Paris, Rome, and to London and then finally to Oxford University. And so Shan used this time, some of it he had religious mission, but other times he had more of what we now call “cultural diplomacy.” He met with some British scientists, he actually met with the King, who had curiosity about China and wanted to ask a few questions, and he met the King of France. I was intrigued by this, again, it was a study of language and cultural contact, and flexibility, and again it tells a different story than the kind of changeless China – this is a very adaptable China, with an international language that we’ve never had since, which was Latin.

Latin was known to Chinese Catholics and Western intellectuals. So it was possible for Shen Fuzong within a few weeks of coming to England, to talk with English professional scientists and people in official positions and to work on organising the books in Oxford University. Because none of the English people in the 17th century knew how to actually write and read Chinese. They could talk some Chinese, some of them. But Shen had a more speedy agenda, because his language skills included Latin and he was able to contact people in England.

I think there might have been a very major impact from this, because the Kangxi Emperor was known for his curiosity about foreign powers and he might have well heard about this story. But, and it’s a big but, Shen Fuzong died of a fever, a very dangerous illness, just after he left England. So what might have been a major cultural change, became simply a curiosity of history. But that’s where I’m spending some of my time now, and some other scholars are as well.

So it seems like China is trying to restore its rightful place in this world, to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. What do you think of the path that China’s taking now? And what do you think is the biggest obstacle in China’s rejuvenation?

You’d have to be very bold to say you could answer every detail of this. I just thought it was an ongoing proof of flexibility, the need to take a sensible view of the border regions around China – to see China not as the only central kingdom but as one of a series of interlocking powers in the far-east and the Pacific region. Nowadays Chinese are spreading some of their own investigations into the Arctic regions, in discussions with Russia or Scandinavia; in the Mediterranean with interest in Greece and the Middle East – that would probably be the next logical step. But China, again if you look at the map, more creatively maybe, the Chinese sphere of action could also be seen to be incorporating New Zealand and Australia and perhaps even some Latin American countries, and China’s been also very active in Africa.

The values have switched from the old foreign influence stage of history. China has the opportunity at least to show much greater flexibility, and also develop its economy, in a way that’ll have really long range beneficial effects for the Chinese people. And it’s for the leadership to know where to come down on this, how much to invest in which aspect and where to build up special skills in China and support them.

What’s your view of the official Chinese narrative of its contemporary history?

The so-called “official narrative” depends which historian is writing what and who is supporting them – is it the commercial market? Is it the ordinary publishing market conducted without official guidance? And maybe we need more openness in the present, two different channels of information and education and ideas about the economic system.

I can just see that some things make China more critical of other societies. We can see that the logic is not always the same as our own. In my case it’s from being raised in England and teaching in the United States and having many friends in China. But there’s so much room for manoeuvre, that’s a good thing about the present time. There really is room for manoeuvre and China doesn’t have to feel pushed into a new kind of subservient position, it doesn’t seem to be true at all. I think if it continues the kind of route we talked about before, in terms of a great power status, that probably would be something that could be modified, that China could do more sharing about the future development of with countries.